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PART A: PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS 
1. Statement of Dissertation 
It has been acknowledged that the appraisal remedy is complicated, technical, time 
consuming and procedurally rigid from the dissidents' perspective. The appraisal remedy has 
been criticised for these very reasons.1 These qualities have been characterised as limitations 
on its efficacy for dissidents. The potential for time delays and the cost implications are cited 
as additional short comings.2 It has been suggested that expert legal advice is required by a 
dissident to in order to exercise the appraisal remedy.3 
The purpose of this dissertation is not to address these issues if indeed they are issues at all. It 
may seem flippant to dismiss these observations. However, it may reasonably be said that all 
enabling legislation is complicated and technical. Any statute that provides one party with a 
remedy against another will set out a procedure to be followed by the remedy seeking party. 
The procedure provided for in legislation generally ensures that barriers to entry deter mala 
fide applicants, but remain fair in order to ensure that those who follow the procedures and 
meet the requirements receive the remedy to which they are entitled. Were the procedures 
less rigid, the remedy might be abused and instead become an instrument of oppression.  
It may be argued that the dissident is helpless in the face of a monolithic corporate entity but 
this sentiment does not account for the fact that the dissident will be paid fair value for its 
shares. Critics of the appraisal remedy ought to bear in mind that the dissident that chooses to 
exercise the remedy does so after the transaction has been approved by a majority of a 
minority in an extraordinarily complicated and rigid approval process. I shall elaborate upon 
this process in due course.  
                                                      
1
 Ezra Davids, Trevor Norwitz and David Yuill 'A microscopic analysis of the new merger and amalgamation 
provision in the Companies Act 71 of 2008' in Tshepo H Mongalo (ed) Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
South African Economy (2010) at 360. 
2
 Farouk HI Cassim (managing ed), Maleka Femida Cassim, Rehana Cassim, Richard Jooste, Joanne Shev and 
Jacqueline Yeates Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 798. 
3
 Maleka Femida Cassim 'The Introduction of the Statutory Merger in South African Corporate Law: Majority 













Concerns in relation to the costs of judicial appraisal are also articulated, in as much as the 
burden of the costs may have a suppressive effect4 on the exercise of the appraisal remedy by 
a dissident. In ordinary litigation, where a litigant is less certain of a favourable outcome, let 
alone being paid, there are procedural and financial hurdles more burdensome than those 
found in the appraisal remedy, particularly where both parties are required to discover 
documents, adduce evidence, lead witnesses and be represented. Even if a party in ordinary 
litigation prevails, the manner in which costs are awarded on a party and party basis means 
that a successful litigant bears a cost of asserting or protecting a right which the fee tariffs do 
not account for. The economic efficiency of a judicial appraisal is unique in its formulation, 
in as much as only one dissident need apply to court, and the remaining dissidents stand to 
benefit as a result of a successful application. Nevertheless, litigation costs are often 
prohibitive, and may deter a dissident from pursuing its appraisal remedy. However, the cost 
of litigation should not form the basis of the critique of the appraisal remedy, for the deterrent 
effect of litigation is not a feature unique to judicial appraisal. 
The criticism of the remedy to which I have alluded appears to be grounded in an egalitarian 
conception of corporate law, which has human rights as a point of departure. This approach 
may be appropriate in cases where argument is made for the inclusion of stakeholder and 
labour protection in a corporate statute - in relation to a remedy available to the minority of 
the minority,5 I am less certain. 
If a private company is effecting a transaction that gives rise to an appraisal remedy, it could 
reasonably be assumed that the management of the company is sophisticated, and that the 
shareholders have a corresponding level of insight into the remedies available to them, 
particularly in light of the close relationship of shareholders in a private company.6 It is 
unlikely that such a shareholder will be overwhelmed by the requirements of the appraisal 
remedy.  
                                                      
4
 Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 806. Davids et al op cit note 1 at 360. 
5
 In the preceding paragraphs, I sketched a brief portrait of the approval process in relation to a transaction. In 
circumstances where a controlling party and parties acting in concert are prohibited from being reckoned for 
the purposes of constituting a quorum  or participating in the vote, it is said that the transaction must be 
approved by a 'majority of the minority'. That being the case, the appraisal remedy is available only to the 
minority of the minority. I shall return to this theme. 
6













Conceptually, the framework of the remedy is simple. After receiving the meeting notice, the 
dissident must send an objection notice to the company before the vote is taken. The dissident 
must vote against the resolution. If the resolution is approved, the company will send an 
adoption notice. After receiving the adoption notice, the dissident must send the company a 
demand. After the company makes an offer, the dissident may accept it or brief an attorney 
for a court application. 
In the circumstances, the use of such concepts as fairness, justice and equality, as understood 
in constitutional jurisprudence, as the basis of Companies Act commentary does not account 
for the inherently unequal nature of the shareholders statuses, and the robust nature of 
commercial endeavour. If the Companies Act can be likened to an infant, it is not yet 
teething. Rather than trying to demand from it that it eat with its mouth closed and behave 
like a gentleman, a better suggestion would be that it be fed a bottle so that it can grow into a 
productive member of statutory society. 
In this dissertation, I present a close textual analysis of section 164 of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008. In it, I will elaborate upon a number of anomalies, several of which are potentially, 
fatal as well as other problem areas. In addition, I will address certain inaccurate 
commentary. I emphasise that the purpose of the dissertation is not to come to a conclusion 
regarding the fairness, justice or worth of the appraisal remedy. The analysis in this 
dissertation is concerned with whether the appraisal remedy is fit for use, that is, whether the 
appraisal remedy in its present fo m is capable of being applied in order to achieve its stated 
purpose. The conceptual merit of the remedy is not considered. 
The analysis of the appraisal remedy as it appears in the Companies Act, will be comparative, 
in as much as the appraisal remedy is derived from the corresponding provision in the 
Canadian Act. 
2. Statement of Terminology 
The terminology used in the Companies Act to describe the subject matter of the appraisal 
remedy is different to the terminology used in the Canada Act, and in the other company laws 
that will be considered. In order to avoid prolix explanation, I will adopt a unified lexicon in 













For ease of reference, I will use the terms below which shall have the meaning ascribed to 
them:7 
'adoption notice' means the notice given by the company in relation to the adoption of 
the resolution to dissidents who have given an objection notice;8  
'amendment' means an amendment to the constitutional documents of the company, 
where such an amendment, if approved, gives rise to the appraisal remedy;9 
'appraisal remedy' means the rights which may be exercised by a dissident as provided 
for in section 164 of the Companies Act, section 190 of the Canadian Act, section 110 
of the New Zealand Act and section 262 of the Delaware Law, as the context may 
require; 
'Canadian Act' means the Canada Business Corporations Act RSC 1985 c C-44, being 
the federal legislation in terms of which corporations are incorporated and regulated 
in Canada; 
'Companies Act' means the Companies Act 71 of 2008; 
'company' means a corporation or a company, the shares of which are the subject 
matter of an appraisal remedy, as the context may require; 
'constitutional documents' means the memorandum of incorporation of the company10 
and any rules11 or the articles,12 as the context requires; 
'Delaware Law' means the Delaware Code, title 8, chapter 1, being the legislation in 
terms of which corporations are incorporated and regulated in the State of Delaware; 
'demand' means the demand made by the dissident to the company for the payment of 
the fair value of the shares;13 
                                                      
7
 Davids et al op cit note 1 at 352. 
8
 Section 164(4) of the Companies Act and section 190(6) of the Canadian Act. 
9
 Section 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act and section 190(1)(b) of the Canadian Act. 
10
 Section 164(4)(a) of the Companies Act. 
11
 Rules as contemplated in section 15(c) of the Companies Act. 
12
 Section 190(1)(b) of the Canadian Act. 
13













'dissident' means a shareholder availing itself of the appraisal remedy; 
'meeting' means a meeting of shareholders called for the purpose of considering and 
adopting a resolution; 
'meeting notice' means the notice of the meeting at which the resolution shall be 
considered, and if approved, adopted; 
'objection notice' means the notice given by the dissident to the company notifying it 
of the dissidents objection to the proposed resolution; 
'New Zealand Act' means the Companies Act 1993 No 105, being the legislation in 
terms of which companies are incorporated and regulated in New Zealand; 
'resolution' means the resolution, irrespective of its character, which must be adopted 
to give effect to the transaction in relation to which the dissident exercises the 
appraisal remedy, as the context may require;14 
'shares' means shares or securities in the company, as the context may require; and 
'transaction' means a transaction which must be approved by resolution, which if 
approved gives rise to the exercise of the appraisal remedy by a dissident, and for the 
purpose of this dissertation shall include, where appropriate, an amendment.15 
3. Statement of Acknowledgement 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of a number of typists 
who, in addition to typing and formatting my preparatory notes and material, answered their 
telephones at all hours. 
Most importantly, I would like to thank Lisa and Alex for their patience, support and love. 
Alex et Lisa sont mon univers. 
                                                      
14















PART B: INTRODUCTION 
4. THE APPRAISAL RIGHT 
4.1 Origins of the Appraisal Right 
The appraisal remedy is an American innovation that was introduced in order to relieve 
controlling shareholders from the constricting requirements of unanimous assent required to 
affect major changes to the nature of a business operated by the company in question.16 In an 
advancing industrial economy, modern enterprises required an adaptive corporate regime 
within which changing business conditions could be accommodated.
17
 Law makers relaxed 
unanimous consent requirements and granted dissidents an appraisal remedy as a counter-
balance.
18
 It was recognised that the flexibility to restructure a company must be balanced 
with the ability of dissidents to maintain or ringfence their assets and rights on the basis on 
which they had initially invested.19 
In the context of transactions having shares as the sole consideration for shareholders of the 
target company, the appraisal remedy functioned as an exit mechanism. Dissidents were, 
upon the exercise of the appraisal remedy, entitled to receive the fair value of their shares in 
cash and were accordingly obliged to relinquish their position in the company. Absent such a 
remedy, dissidents would otherwise have been expected to receive an investment not of their 
choosing,20 in a company in which they had no desire to remain, with a risk profile they had 
not accepted.21 This understanding of the appraisal remedy, known as the 'defeated 
expectations' view',22 was the basis of the justification for the extension of the remedy. The 
                                                      
16
 Bayless Manning 'The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker' (1962) 72 Yale LJ 223 at 
226 - 227. 
17
 Wayne D Gray The annotated Canada Business Corporations Act 2ed (2002) at 372 and the following related 
statutes: Corporations Returns Act, Investment Canada Act. 
18
 See Manning op cit note 16 at 228-9; William T Allen and Reinier Kraakman Commentaries and Cases on the 
Law of Business Organizations (2003) at 452. This causal link has more recently been doubted: see, eg, Hideki 
Kanda and Saul Levmore 'The Appraisal Remedy and The Goals of Corporate Law' (1985) 32 UCLA LR 429 at 
436. There has been much vigorous debate in America on the appraisal right, its purpose and the justifications 
for and against it. However, much of this debate is beyond the scope of this article. 
19
 Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 796 - 797. 
20
 For instance, in the case of a traditional pooling-type merger, where the consideration is in the form of 
securities.  See Chapter 15: Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and Offers.
 
21
 MF Cassim op cit note 3 at 158. See Arthur R Pinto and Douglas M Branson Understanding Corporate Law 
(1999) at 127-8; Allen & Kraakman op cit note 18 at 452-3. 
22
 MF Cassim op cit note 3 at 158. Robert Charles Clark Corporate Law (1986) at 444. See Manning op cit note 













dissident had an expectation in relation to the conduct of the company's business, which had 
been disappointed. 
Subsequently, the regulation of corporate transactions was relaxed. Cash was permitted as 
consideration in transactions. The justification for the appraisal remedy was then understood 
as a mechanism to ensure that dissidents' positions were eliminated at a fair value.23 The 
'remedy-for-unfairness' justification24 was premised upon the fact that shareholders were not 
privy to the negotiation of the transaction agreement in terms of which the merger was 
implemented. As such, the opportunity for directors to self-deal is acknowledged. With the 
shareholders' unanimous approval no longer necessary, the appraisal remedy assumed the 
function of a bulwark against directors' self-interested decision making and ensured that 
dissidents' interests were accounted for.  
On either view, the prospect of substantial opposition to a transaction might ensure that the 
board reconsider the implications of its proposed implementation.25 Dissidents now rely on 
the appraisal remedy to challenge the adequacy of the price offered26 and as a check on 
directors' opportunism.27 If sufficient dissidents object to the consideration, creating a heavy 
drain on the company's cash resources, the transaction will effectively be blocked. 
Instead of placing the dissident at the mercy of the majority, appraisal provisions permit the 
dissident to withdraw from the company and, if enough dissidents are affected, to bar the 
proposed transaction. Nevertheless, the majority shareholders can, if they go through the 
proper formalities and if they pay the dissidents, effect almost any transaction with impunity. 
The result is a solution of the problem that protects minority shareholders from 
discrimination and, at the same time, preserves flexibility within the enterprise, permitting it 
to adapt to changing business conditions.
28
 
                                                      
23
 MF Cassim op cit note 3 at 158.See Robert W Hamilton The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell 5ed (2000) at 
628; Pinto & Douglas op cit note 21 at 127-8; Allen & Kraakman op cit note 18 at 452-3. 
24
 MF Cassim op cit note 3 at 158. See Clark op cit note 22 at 445. 
25
 MF Cassim op cit note 3 at 158. M Eisenberg 'The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modem 
Corporate Decision Making' (1969) 57 California LR 1 at 85-6; Kanda & Levmore op cit note 18 at 443-4; 
Clark op cit note 22 at 445. 
26
 For example, in the case of a cash merger, where the shareholders receive cash as merger consideration and 
are cashed-out. 
27
 Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 797. 
28














Certain transactions are recognised as sufficiently important to warrant the availability of a 
remedy to dissidents. They are ordinarily characterised as fundamental transactions and as in 
the Companies Act include mergers or amalgamations29, disposals of assets30 and schemes of 
arrangement.31 A remedy might also be also available when the constitutional documents of a 
company are amended in a manner materially adverse to the rights of shareholders.32 Out of 
'concern for the helpless minority shareholder',33 the appraisal remedy has been fashioned to 
give optionality to dissidents in such circumstances.  
The appraisal remedy is contentious. It has generated much commentary.34 Certain of the 
controversy relates to the fundamental changes in respect of which the appraisal remedy 
ought to apply. Bayless Manning, in his seminal article published in 1962,35 questions the 
arbitrary selection of certain transactions which State legislatures in the United States have 
selected for special treatment.36 In the appendix to his article,37 he sets out a survey of State 
appraisal statutes by transactions giving rise to the remedy. Interestingly, of the States that 
                                                      
29
 Section 113. 
30
 Section 112. 
31
 Section 114. 
32
 Section 164(2)(a). 
33
 Manning op cit note 16 at 227.  
34
 See Manning op cit note 16. William L Caryt 'Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware' 
(1973-1974) 83 Yale LJ 663; Michael P Dooley and Michael D Goldman, 'Some Comparisons Between the 
Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law' (2000-2001) 56 Bus Law 737; J 
Kirkland Grant 'The Delaware Appraisal Statute' (1981) 6 DeLJ Corp L 590; Kanda & Levmore op cit note 18 
at 429; Peter V Letsou 'The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law' (1998) 39 B C LR 1121; William F Looney 
'Dissenting Minority Stockholder's Right of Appraisal' (1962) 4 B C LR 85; Charles W Murdock 'The Evolution 
of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares' (1989-
1990) 65 Notre Dame LR 425; Michael R Orlando 'The Appraisal Remedy in Illinois under the 1983 Business 
Corporation Act: Some Suggestions for Improvement' (1985-1986) 19 J. Marshall LR 229; Michelle M Pepin 
'Exclusivity of Appraisal - The Possibility of Extinguishing Shareholder Claims' (1992) 42 Case W Res LR 955; 
Ralph Winter 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation' (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 251; 
Anders Bruun and Michael Lansky 'The Appraisal Remedy for Dissidents in Canada: Is it Effective?' (1977-
1978) 8 Man LJ 683; Brian Cheffins 'An Economic Analysis of the Oppression Remedy: Working Towards a 
More Coherent Picture of Corporate Law' (1990) 40 U Toronto LJ 775; Jeffrey G Macintosh 'Shareholders' 
Appraisal Right in Canada A Critical Reappraisal' (1988) 13 Can U S LJ 299 / (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall LJ 201; 
Greta M Fung 'A Common Goal from Two Different Paths: Protection of Minority Shareholders in Delaware 
and Canada' (1993-1994) 57 Alb LR 4. 
35
 See Manning op cit note 16 at 223. 
36
 Ibid at 241-242. 
37













provide for the appraisal remedy in circumstances similar to the Companies Act,38 only the 
statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana are comparable.39 
Whilst the debate regarding the utility of the appraisal remedy is irrelevant for present 
purposes, it is important to note that the scope of the remedy has evolved. It is no longer a 
tool solely for the benefit of dissidents in circumstances where they desire to liquidate their 
position in a company. The appraisal remedy's major contribution is not in shielding 
dissidents, but in giving 'greater mobility of action to the majority'.40 As pointed out by 
Manning, 'the appraisal statutes may be viewed either as a bulwark for the rights of the 
minority, or as a lubricant to speed the spread of majoritarianism. Of course the statutes 
might do both, depending upon their administration and their application.'41 
The justification given for the review of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was that the company 
law regime was highly formalistic creating artificial preferences for certain structures.42 This 
is noteworthy in as much as certain transactions artificially selected remain prominent in their 
status as giving rise minority remedies and requiring extraordinary approval. It remains the 
case that companies may undertake and implement non-fundamental transactions with value 
diminishing consequences that do not warrant such scrutiny. The managerial fiat 
contemplated in section 66(1) is a far more potent weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous 
board that the relatively small shield given to dissidents in the form of section 164. 
4.3 The Appraisal Right in the Companies Act 
The appraisal remedy, a novel concept in our corporate law,43 'effectively grants a put option 
to dissatisfied shareholders'.44 Section 164 is derived in large part from the equivalent 
provision in the Canadian Act.45 The Canadian equivalent has been called a 'procedural 
                                                      
38
 71 of 2008. 
39
 Manning op cit note 16 at 262. 
40
 Manning op cit note 16 at 227. 
41
 Manning op cit note 16 at 230. 
42
 South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, Government 
Gazette, 4 No 26493 23 June 2004 at 14 and 15. 
43
 This remedy is also not adopted wholesale but has been tailored to the South African context. For example, 
the Companies Act does not include the Delaware 'market out' which provides that appraisal rights are not 
available if target company shareholders are receiving only publicly traded stock in consideration for their 
shares. See further Davids et al op cit note 1 at 352. 
44
 Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 796. 
45













morass'.46 It too was introduced as a counterweight to the newly adopted merger provisions, 
which together were hoped to provide flexibility and enhance efficiency in the economy.47 
In the ordinary course, the appraisal remedy may be invoked by dissidents once a notice 
given by a company, in circumstances other than business rescue,48 informs shareholders of a 
meeting at which a resolution49 pursuant to a transaction shall be considered for adoption. The 
notice must inform shareholders that the appraisal remedy may be invoked.50
 
Although not within the scope of this dissertation, there are a number of provisions that might 
be found in appraisal remedies that do not feature in section 164. Discussion shall be limited 
to merely mentioning them and few apposite comments.  
The Companies Act does not make provision for a short-form merger procedure,51 or at least 
a mechanism to facilitate such mergers. The short-form merger procedure in the Canadian 
Act52 permits approval of the implementation of a short-form merger by way of a board 
resolution of each merging company. 
Neither of the Canadian Act, New Zealand Act53 or the Companies Act has a market-
exception excluding recourse to the appraisal remedy to dissidents holding listed shares. The 
Delaware Law excludes recourse to the appraisal remedy to the holders of listed shares that 
are traded in a liquid market54 and where the listed price of the shares is a reliable indication 
of their fair value.55 It was suggested that the Companies Act does not include the market 
                                                      
46
 Bruce Welling Corporate Law in Canada The Governing Principles (2006) at 568; cf Piet Delport and 
Quintus Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2012) at 577. 
47
 Notice of intention to introduce a Bill into Parliament: Explanatory summary of Bill General Notice 166 of 
2007 at 13. 
48
 Section 164(1). 
49
 Sections 112, 113 and 114. The resolutions in question relate to the fundamental transactions contemplated 
the Companies Act, as well as the alteration of the preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of any class of 
its shares in any manner 'materially adverse to the rights or interests' of holders of that class of shares as 
contemplated in section 37(8). 
50
 Section 164(2). 
51
 A short form merger is a simplified form of a merger between a holding company and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, called a vertical short-form merger, or between two wholly-owned subsidiaries of a holding 
company, known as a horizontal short-form merger, cf MF Cassim op cit note 3 at 155 and 158. 
52
 See section 184 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, 1985. 
53
 Companies Act 1993. 
54
 Listed shares or widely traded shares with more than two thousand record shareholders. 
55













exception because 'the financial markets are notoriously imperfect'.56 It is unclear whether 
this remark applies to the market in this particular jurisdiction or markets generally. 
The grant of the appraisal remedy acknowledges that transactions may have significant and 
far-reaching consequences for shareholders,57 the nature of the company and the rights 
attaching to shares.58  As such, dissidents may, when circumstances permit, opt out of the 
company by withdrawing the fair value of their shares in cash by exercising the appraisal 
remedy after receiving the notice as aforesaid. 
The Companies Act is silent as to how the fair value is to be arrived at, although it does 
provide for the appointment of an expert appraiser to assist the court with the valuation 
process.  It may be that guidance can be taken from the Canadian courts, which have, like the 
Delaware courts, undertaken court valuations for some time and developed a settled approach 
to this task.59 
Notwithstanding that dissidents might never need to exercise the appraisal remedy, its 
existence60 functions as an incentive for companies to avoid transactions that may be unfair to 
minority shareholders61 and encourage them to exercise the appraisal remedy. On the other 
hand, it may deter well-meaning boards from transactions that could benefit the company.62 
4.4 Additional Safeguards  
The appraisal remedy itself, is one part of and integral to a broader approval process. Viewed 
in its totality, the appraisal remedy is penultimate step in the implementation process of 
certain transactions.  
Regardless of a variation of approval thresholds in a company's constitutional documents, a 
resolution pursuant to a transaction must be passed with the support of at least 75 per cent of 
                                                      
56
 MF Cassim op cit note 3 at 162. Were this is the case, one would have to accept that shares are traded at 
'notoriously imperfect' prices which do not represent fair value. This begs the question whether a dissident who 
purchased shares at less than fair value should be entitled to fair value. There is no satisfactory answer to this 
question. 
57
 Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 796. 
58
 Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 796. 
59
 Davids et al op cit note 1 at 360. 
60
 FH Easterbrook and D Fischel The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991) at 145; Allen & Kraakman 
op cit note 18 at 140. 
61
 There are other protections available to dissidents, minorities and oppressed persons as set out in Part B of 
Chapter 7. These are mentioned briefly below. See footnotes 148 - 156. 
62













the voting rights exercised on that resolution.63 The voting rights controlled by 'an acquiring 
party' or a 'person related to'
64
 or 'acting in concert with'
65
 an acquiring party must not be 
included in calculating the percentage of voting rights required or actually voted in support of 
the resolution. Furthermore, it is not permissible to pass the resolution by way of a round 
robin resolution in terms of section 60.
66
  
The quorum for the meeting is at least 25% of all of the eligible voting rights or such higher 
percentage if one is prescribed in the constitutional documents. The voting rights of an 
acquiring party or any person related to or acting in concert with an acquiring party must not 
be included in determining whether the applicable quorum requirements have been met.67 In 
the event that the resolution is approved, it may still be subject to the judicial review 
procedure contemplated in section 115(3). If the transaction is affected, it is regulated in 
terms of Parts B and C of Chapter 5, that is sections 117 to 127 and the Takeover 
Regulations, being regulations 81 to 122.68  
The 'majority of the minority' approval requirement protects minority shareholders in 
circumstances where the transaction is not conducted on an arms-length basis and where the 
acquirer is able to exert influence on the disposer.69 Judicial review of the transaction is 
required if more than 15 per cent of the shareholders at the meeting voted against the 
resolution, and any of them require the company first to seek approval from the court. In 
addition, any shareholder may apply to the court for a review of the transaction, regardless of 
how many shareholders voted against it. One might question how effective this remedy might 
                                                      
63
 Section 115(1) read with section 115(2)(a). 
64
 To determine who is 'related' to an acquiring party, see the definition of 'related' in section 2(1) of the 
Companies Act. 
65
 For the purposes of section 115(4) 'act in concert' has the meaning set out in section 117(1)(b). 
66
 If the company has only one shareholder, the section does not require that the sole shareholder meet with 
anyone but, as with any other meeting of shareholders, the statutory formalities around convening and holding 
the meeting must be observed and all relevant paperwork must be signed. 
67
 Section 115(4)(a). 
68
 Companies Regulations 2011. 
69
 Davids et al op cit note 1 at 357 and 358. According to Davids et al, this serves as a valuable protection for 
minority shareholders and is found under the 'Related Party' provisions of the JSE Listing Requirements (Rule 1 
0.4(e)) and also under the 'whitewash' provisions of a mandatory offer under the previous Security Regulations 
Code (Rule 8.7). They note a further concern, namely that the terms 'acquiring party' and 'person acting in 
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be in practice. First, the grounds on which a court may review and set aside a merger 
resolution are relatively limited. It requires not merely unfairness, but manifest unfairness, 
and procedural irregularity must have materially tainted the transaction.70 
A second limiting factor to the effectiveness of judicial review which has been identified, 
being the potential cost of the proceedings, which may be a deterrent to shareholders. In so 
far as the 15 per cent threshold is met and the company is required to initiate the review and 
would bear most of the cost. The review remedy is available to those who voted against the 
transaction, but not to shareholders who did not or were unable to vote against the resolution, 
regardless of whether they suffer material prejudice as a result of the transaction.71  
Once a resolution has passed this rigorous approval procedure and been subject to review, 
one wonders what it is that the dissident knows that the company and majority do not. 
PART C: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE APPRAISAL RIGHT 
5. STANDING 
5.1 Standing in relation to the Remedy 
In the Canadian Act, the idea of a 'dissident' is introduced in section 183(2)(b) in terms of 
which notice of a meeting must be given at which a transaction resolution shall be 
considered. The meeting notice must state that 'a dissenting shareholder is entitled to be paid 
the fair value of their shares'. The idea of a 'dissent' is elaborated upon in section 190(1) 
which states that 'a holder of shares of any class of a corporation may dissent… if the 
corporation resolves to … effect a major transaction'. The Canadian Act implies that the 
recipient of the meeting notice is entitled to dissent in accordance with the provisions of 
section 190(1) by sending a written objection to the resolution, in accordance with 
section 190(5). 
In the Companies Act the term 'dissenting shareholder' first appears in section 164(3) which 
simply states that 'at any time before a resolution referred to in subsection 2 is to be voted on, 
a dissenting shareholder may give the company a written notice objecting to the resolution'.  
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The question arises whether the right to dissent is available to persons other than the 
recipients of the meeting notice. If this question can be answered in the affirmative, the 
appraisal remedy may be used for purposes other than that for which it was initially intended.  
Although the requirements for qualifying as a dissident in Delaware are not contiguous with 
the Companies Act, there have been developments in that jurisdiction in relation to 
complexities arising out of the use of the appraisal remedy. Certain shareholders who acquire 
shares after notification of a merger attempted to perfect the appraisal remedy.72 Whilst the 
mechanism in terms of which the matter was resolved is not of interest,73 what was of concern 
was the risk that 'the appraisal statutes will become warped far beyond their intended 
purpose, turning into a new vehicle for meritless strike suits rather than an effective tool for 
corporate governance'.74 
In the Canadian context, a question arose whether a beneficial shareholder was entitled to 
exercise the right to dissent. In the Canadian Act, it is clear that only registered shareholders 
are entitled to dissent. In the case of Silber v BGR Precious Metals Inc75 it was held that a 
shareholder acquiring a share and being registered as such may exercise the right to dissent, 
notwithstanding that he was not a shareholder at the time when the meeting notice was 
delivered. The dissidents acquired their shares after the announcement of a proposed 
transaction. Although it was argued that the dissidents should not be allowed to make use of 
the appraisal remedy because they were aware of the proposed transaction before they 
became shareholders, the court held that shareholders could employ the appraisal remedy, 
regardless of that fact.76 
In another Canadian case, Silber v Pointer Exploration Corp77, the court held, that if the 
company wanted to control the entitlement of shareholders to make use of the appraisal 
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remedy, it could have specified in the information circular that only shareholders registered at 
the date of that circular were entitled to employ the appraisal remedy.78 
The position is somewhat different under the Companies Act. A 'shareholder' is defined as 
'the holder of a share issued by the company and who is entered as such into the … register'.79 
Nevertheless, a person with a beneficial interest in a share shall be entitled to vote on any 
matter provided that the beneficial interest includes the right to vote and that person's name is 
on the company's register of disclosures as a holder of a beneficial interest.80 What is less 
clear is whether the right to vote extends to and includes the right to give the company a 
written notice objecting to the resolution contemplated in section 164(3), or if that power is 
reserved for registered shareholders only. 
In relation to subsequent 'registered' shareholders, the Companies Act provides for the 
determination of a record date set for the purposes of determining inter alia which 
shareholders are entitled to receive notice of shareholder meetings, participate in and vote at 
shareholders meetings.81 The board is entitled to set that r cord date, and if it does not, the 
record date is the last date by which a company is required to give the meeting notice.82 The 
constitutional documents of a company may provide for the determination of a record date set 
by the directors, for the purposes of determining which shareholders are entitled to vote at 
such a meeting. 
It has been questioned what position a South African court might take in relation to whether 
beneficial shareholders or subsequent shareholders may be entitled to the appraisal remedy.83 
Save in circumstances where the constitutional documents of a company provide otherwise,84 
the analysis above closes the enquiry.85 
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6.1 Notice of Meeting 
An academic commentator
86
 observed that although section 164 of the Act does not compel 
the company to give the meeting notice, section 164(2) does require the company to include a 
statement informing shareholders of the appraisal remedy.
87
 The purpose of section 164 is not 
to create the obligation to notify shareholders of such meetings, but to establish the 
framework within which dissidents may pursue the appraisal remedy ancillary to the 
transactions.
88
 The particular notice requirements are found in section 112 (disposal of 
substantially all assets or undertaking), section 113 (merger or amalgamation) and 
section 114 (scheme of arrangement),
89
 and in sections 61 and 62.90 
Section 164(2) states that a meeting notice must include 'a statement informing shareholders 
of their rights under this section'. Each of the particular sections referred to in the preceding 
paragraph has a unique formulation in relation to the form such a statement must take.91 
Section 112(3) requires 'a written summary of the provisions of section 164'. Section 113(5) 
requires 'a copy or summary of section 164, in a manner that satisfies prescribed standards'. 
Section 114 requires 'a copy of section 164 to be included in the report'. 
In light of the inconsistent terminology, it is advisable to adopt a comprehensive approach 
and in a meeting notice include a copy and a summary of section 164. Reference to 'a copy or 
summary of section 164, in a manner that satisfies prescribed standards' is problematic as 
there are no 'prescribed standards' in relation to notices. Save as aforesaid, the phrase 
appears in the Companies Act in relation to maintenance of securities registers92 and the 
disclosure of information in the annual financial statements93 only.94 The Act provides that 
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meeting notices must be delivered to shareholders in 'the prescribed manner' and that the 
notice must be in the prescribed form.
95
 
Section 6(4) of the Act provides that if no form is prescribed by the Act, the producer of the 
notice must provide that notice in plain language.96 Section 6(4) does not apply to the drafting 
of resolutions to be included in a meeting notice.
97
  
In relation to the requirement to include the appraisal remedy statement in the meeting notice, 
a Canadian court has held that a notice which simply states that 'the Act provides that a 
shareholder has a right to dissent if the corporation resolves to amend its articles' will not 
suffice.98 The Canadian Act refers to a notice that encompasses at least an explanation of the 
bundle of rights given to dissidents of which the critical right is the right to be paid for the 
shares in the event of a structural change to the constitutional documents.99 
6.2 Notice Anomaly 
In relation to the duty of the company to give the meeting notice in terms of section 164(2), 
there appears to be an anomaly.  Section 64(4) provides that a material defect in the giving of 
a meeting notice shall render the meeting null and void and incompetent, unless all those 
entitled to receive it ratify the defective notice. This provision is qualified.  
If the material defect relates only to particular matters on the agenda, such matters may be 
severed and the notice remains valid with respect to the remaining matters.100 The meeting 
may consider the severed matter if the defective notice has been ratified in terms of 
section 62(4)(d) (sic). There is no sub-section (4)(d) in the Companies Act. Assuming that the 
intended ratification takes place in terms of sub-section (4), the meeting may consider the 
severed matter. 
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In order for a dissident to make a demand to be paid fair value,101 the dissident must have 
inter alia sent a notice of objection contemplated in section 164(3),102 voted against the 
resolution103 and complied with all the procedural requirements of section 164.104 
A dissident is excused from sending the objection notice if the company failed to give the 
meeting notice, or failed to include the appraisal remedy statement in that notice.
105
 The 
exception presupposes that the meeting was held, the resolution was adopted and is valid 
notwithstanding the defective notice. If this were not the case, there would be no need to 
excuse the dissident's failure to send the objection notice. The conclusion to be drawn is that 
the failure to send the meeting notice in the circumstances of a transaction is not a material 
defect as contemplated in section 62(4),106 since it is assumed that the resolution can be 
adopted without the absent dissident having to ratify the defective notice. 
There may be merit in this approach, in as much as section 62(6) states that an immaterial 
defect in the form of giving notice, or an accidental failure in the delivery of the notice to any 
particular shareholder to whom it is addressed does not invalidate any action taken at that 
meeting. If that approach is correct, the requirement to include in the meeting notice the 
appraisal remedy statement,107 is immaterial and may be ignored. The requirement that the 
'notice of a shareholders' meeting to consider a resolution to approve a disposal contemplated 
in (section 112) must … include or be accompanied by a written summary of … the 
provisions of section 115 and 164'108 is immaterial and may also be ignored. The requirement 
that a meeting notice contemplated in section 113 'must include or be accompanied by a copy 
or summary of … the provisions of section 115 and 164'109 is immaterial and need not met. 
Although the report to the board compiled by the independent expert contemplated in 
section 114 'must at a minimum … include a copy of section 115 and 164' this is not the case, 
as the failure to include of the copy s164 is immaterial.  
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On this approach, the use of the word must in each extract, is misleading in as much as the 
failure to include the appraisal remedy notice in the meeting notice does not invalidate any 
action taken at the meeting, despite the seemingly peremptory nature of the instruction.   
This must be so, by the very fact that section 164(6) assumes that the resolution is adopted, 
despite the company's failure to give the meeting notice, and excuses non-compliance with 
certain subsequent procedural requirements in the case of dissidents who were not given the 
meeting notice. 
This anomaly shall be referred to as the notice anomaly. In and of itself, the notice anomaly 
appears to be a rather serious conceptual blunder, the consequences of which manifest later in 
the section. I will address the consequences of the notice anomaly in due course. 
6.3 Notice of Objection 
A rather strained distinction has been suggested110 between the 'written notice' objecting to 
the resolution referred to section 134(3) and a 'notice of objection' referred to in 
section 164(5)(a)(i), on the basis that the latter is expressed as being written. The distinction, 
it is averred, is fortified by the fact that the unwritten 'notice of objection' in 
section 164(5)(a)(i) does not refer to the 'written notice of objection' in section 164(3) or 
section 164(4)(a). Based on that distinction, the commentator concludes that an unwritten 
'notice of objection' is required in addition to a 'written notice of objection'.111 The 
commentator then attempts to distinguish between the unwritten 'notice of objection', the 
'written notice of objection' and a further 'notice of intention to oppose',112 referred to in 
section 37(8)(a) and section 115(8)(a).  
It is then suggested that a dissident is required to give three distinct notices signifying 
opposition to the resolution. This suggestion cannot be supported in the circumstances. A 
purposive interpretation of the Companies Act, as is required by section 5(1) read with 
section 7(b)(i) and (j) would require the reasonable reader to accept that the three notices 
referred to above are indeed the same. In any event, the assertion that the unwritten 'notice of 
objection' and unwritten 'notice of intention to oppose' must be distinguished from the 
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'written notice' may be resolved by reference to section 6(4)(b) and subsection (5) which 
require notices be in writing, or at least in a form that is reduced to a document. 
Nevertheless, the giving of the objection notice by the dissident is an essential pre-condition 
to 'perfecting' the right to an appraisal,113 which may be excused in circumstances where the 
company failed to give notice of the meeting.114 No time is provided by which the objection 
notice must be given, save that it must be given before the resolution is put to the vote. 
Therefore, the dissident may arrive at the meeting and give the objecting notice at any time 
before the vote is taken. 
Unlike the demand contemplated in section 164(5), the giving of the objection notice does 
not impair the rights of the dissident as contemplated in section 164(9). Consequently, the 
dissident may refrain from pursuing the appraisal remedy notwithstanding having given the 
objection notice. It has been suggested that the nonbinding nature of the objection notice may 
be abused in as much as dissidents may give the objection notice without any intention of 




Canadian commentators have understood the benefit of the objection notice on the basis that 
'other shareholders may be influenced by the number of shareholders who indicate an 
intention to assert the dissent remedy should the proposal be approved'.116 It has been 
suggested that the similar considerations may be applicable in South Africa, namely to 
provide 'scope for the board to rethink its strategy, especially where large numbers of 
minority shareholders indicate their intention to dissent'.
117
 This proposition is difficult to 
sustain in relation to the Companies Act for the reasons given below.  
In the Canadian Act, the notice must be given 'at or before any meeting of shareholders at 
which a resolution ... is to be voted on'.118 In the Companies Act a dissident 'may give the 
company a written notice objecting to the resolution' ...'(a)t any time before a resolution ... is 
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to be voted on'.119 In both cases, there is no time stated before which the objection notice must 
be given other than before the vote is taken at the meeting (attendance at which is 
compulsory, in South Africa). 
Since the Companies Act, unlike the Canadian Act, makes it a requirement that the dissident 
votes against the resolution120 the rational given for requiring the objection notice is 
unconvincing, particularly when a dissident is entitled to give the objection notice moments 
before voting begins. Nothing is gained by requiring compliance with both the opposition 
notice and the nix vote. The Canadian appraisal remedy does not require an explicit vote 
against the resolution. An abstention is sufficient. 
Whilst the objection notice has a distinct and unique function in Canada, where no nix vote is 
required, the objection notice does not provide the board with any further insight over and 
above the opposing votes. The additional step required by the Companies Act offers no 
apparent benefit to the company or the dissident. Any perceived benefit the company may 
enjoy from such 'advance notice' is moderated in light of th  fact that the dissident can delay 
giving the objection notice to the last minute. 
6.4 Partial Dissent 
The Canadian Act permits a partial dissent.  Section 190(1)121 states that a holder of shares of 
any class of a company may dissent if the company resolves to, inter alia, amend its articles 
… to add, change or remove any provisions restricting or constraining the issue, transfer or 
ownership of shares of that class. Section 190(3) states that 'a shareholder who complies with 
the section is entitled ... to be paid by the corporation the fair value of the shares in respect of 
which the shareholder dissents'. 
The right to a partial dissent is qualified by section 190(4) in terms of which a claim in terms 
of section 190 may only be made with respect to all the shares of a class held on behalf of any 
one beneficial owner and registered in the name of the dissident. The demand required in 
terms of section 190(7) requires that the number and class of shares in respect of which a 
dissident dissents is set out therein. The Canadian position is that a dissident may dissent in 
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relation to one class of shares even if it holds shares in more than one class, provided that it 
dissents in relation to all the shares in the class held by it. 
The South African position is less clear, particularly in relation to the breadth of the effect of 
the appraisal remedy in circumstances where the company amends its constitutional 
documents as contemplated in section 37(8). At issue is whether the dissident in such 
circumstances is required to engage the remedy in relation to all its shares, or in relation to 
the affected class only. Seen from another perspective, the issue may be that when an 
amendment is proposed to one class of shares, the dissident is given an opportunity to invoke 
the appraisal remedy in relation to all classes of shares held by it. On either construction, 
prejudice may be suffered.  
In the first case, the dissident may be forced to have all the shares appraised, in circumstances 
where the unaffected class of shares are well placed. In the second case, a dissident may 
exercise the appraisal remedy opportunistically and in relation to all the shares held by it, 
regardless of an unaffected class, exposing the company to a mass extraction of capital. 
The first mention of the shares that form the subject matter of the appraisal remedy is in 
section 164(5) - a dissident may demand that the company pay the fair value for 'all of the 
shares of the company held by that person'. In order to exercise the appraisal remedy in the 
case of an amendment to the constitutional documents, the dissident must hold 'shares of a 
class that are materially and adversely affected by the amendment'.122 The wording of 
section 164(5) is problematic in as much as the two operative phrases, namely 'all of the 
shares' and 'shares of a class' are seemingly at odds. 
The wording used in section 164(5) indicates that a dissident, who holds shares in more than 
one class, may make a demand, but if the demand is made, the demand must be in respect of 
all of the shares of the company held by (it), notwithstanding that only shares of a class are 
affected by the amendment.
123
 Put differently it appears that if an amendment affects only a 
particular class of share, the dissident may only exercise the appraisal remedy in relation to 
all the shares held by it. The unfairness and prejudice following a narrow interpretation of 
section 164(5) would be unfortunate.  
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From a dissident point of view, in order to protect the affected shares, it would have to 
relinquish its position in relation to un-affected shares, the latter of which may be a sound 
investment and, but for the narrow interpretation of section 164(5), would best be left as is. 
This is the dissident conundrum.  
From a company point of view, a board might be disinclined to propose bona fide 
amendments to the constitutional documents that affect one class of shares, for fear of a mass 
exodus of opportunistic dissidents seizing an opportunity to liquidate their capital. This is the 
company conundrum. 
The dissident and company conundrums are certainly not what the legislature intended and 
do no justice to the policy for the inclusion of the appraisal remedy in the Companies Act. In 
relation to the conundrums identified, the harsh consequence of a narrow reading 
section 164(5) might avoided by construing sub-sections 164(8) to (10) as qualifying 
section 164(5), in addition to giving substance to it. 
Section 164(8) states that the demand must state, inter alia, 'the number and class of shares' in 
respect of which the shareholder seeks payment. Section 164(9) states that after having sent 
the demand the dissident has 'no further rights in respect of those shares, other than to be paid 
their fair value'. Section 164(10) provides upon the occurrence of certain events, that 'the 
shareholder's rights in respect of the shares are reinstated without interruption'. 
The italicised words in the preceding paragraph are definitive, is in as much as the phrase 
'class of shares'124 presupposes that there are other shares in relation to which the dissident 
does not seek payment. That rights in respect of those shares125 are impaired presupposes that 
there are rights in relation to other shares that shall not be impaired and may be exercised. 
The position must be as follows: a demand is made in respect of a number and class of 
shares.126 After delivery of the demand, the dissident has no further rights in respect of those 
shares;127 upon the occurrence of certain events, the rights in respect of the shares which are 
the subject matter of the demand is sent are reinstated without interruption.128  
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In order to solve the conundrums, one would have to read in an implied qualifier, such as 'of 
those shares held by a person in a class affected by an amendment contemplated in 
subsection(5)(a)(ii) or otherwise, '... such that the preamble to subsection (5) read as follows:  
A shareholder may demand that the company pay the shareholder the fair value of those 
shares held by a person in a class affected by an amendment contemplated in 
subsection(5)(a)(ii) or otherwise, for all of the shares of the company held by that person if— 
Although rather inelegantly phrased, the insertion of an implied qualifier such as that 
suggested does away with ambiguity of the present wording, and goes some way to avoid the 
prejudice which would otherwise have arisen.129 
7. ADOPTING THE RESOLUTION 
Where the resolution is defeated, the dissident's right to an appraisal falls away. There is no 
longer a transaction from which to dissent. Similarly, the dissident has no right to an 
appraisal where (subsequent to the approval of the resolution) the directors revoke a 
resolution in terms of section 164(9)(c). The Canadian Act has a similar mechanism.130 In 
addition, if a dissident gives an objection notice but subsequently votes in favour of the 
resolution, the right of dissent is forfeited.131 
Canadian commentators have observed that the objection notice given by the dissident to the 
company prior to the vote is not binding upon the dissident.132 Subsequent to the vote being 
taken, the dissident may simply elect not to assert its right to the appraisal remedy. This is 
achieved by refraining from any further action pursuant to the appraisal remedy. 
Section 115(1) provides that despite section 65 and any provision of the constitutional 
documents or resolution of directors or holders of the company's shares to the contrary, a 
transaction cannot be implemented unless approved in terms of s115.133 The consequence of 
this is two-fold. Any provisions in the constitutional document that varies the thresholds for a 
special resolution as permitted in section 65(10) are inapplicable.  
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Importantly though, section 115(8)(b), states that the 'holder ... is entitled to seek relief in 
terms of section 164 if that person ... was present at the meeting and voted against that special 
resolution. Similarly, section 37(8)(b) states that 'any holder ... is entitled to seek relief in 
terms of section 164 if that shareholder ... was present at the meeting, and voted against that 
resolution'. 
A further question arises in relation to whether the resolution in question must be approved at 
a meeting, or whether a round robin resolution would suffice in the circumstances. In this 
regard, it should be noted that section 115(2) expressly refers to 'at a meeting called for that 
purpose'. As such, the resolution must be passed at a meeting and cannot be approved by 
round robin as envisaged in section 60. 134 
It has been asserted135 that a dissident is specifically required to be present at the meeting in 
question. Presumably this assertion is based on the use of the wording of section 115(8)(b) 
and section 37(8)(b) which contain the words ' if that person ... was present at the meeting' 
and  ' if that shareholder ... was present at the meeting'. The commentator states that it is 
unclear whether a dissident may be represented, and vote in opposition to this resolution, by 
proxy.136 
Clarity may be had by reference to the definition of 'present at a meeting', in section 1, which 
means 'to be present in person, or able to participate in the meeting by electronic 
communication, or to be represented by a proxy who is present in person or able to 
participate in the meeting by electronic communication'. Section 58 is instructive in as much 
as it provides for the general right of a shareholder to be represented by proxy  
7.1 Meeting 
The dissident is required to vote in opposition to the resolution, notwithstanding having given 
the objection notice. The Canadian Act requires that only an objection notice be required to 
engage the appraisal remedy. The requirement that the dissident vote against the resolution,137 
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in addition to giving the objection notice, is not easily explained. It has consequences that 
will be elaborated upon in the next section. In any event, the Canadian approach, requiring 
only an objection notice is far more efficient.  
7.2 The Vote Anomaly 
It is already contemplated that the company may fail to give the meeting notice. The issues 
relating to the failure to send the meeting notice have been addressed above. I have also 
considered the conclusion that might be reached in relation to the manner in which non-
compliance with the obligation to send the meeting notice is resolved in section 164. 
Of deeper concern, regarding the non-compliance with the meeting notice obligations, is the 
effect it has on the ability of a dissident to perfect its right to demand payment of the fair 
value of its shares. 
As mentioned above, section 164(7) requires a dissident to have complied with 
section 164(5), before it is entitled to make any such demand. In order to qualify and meet the 
requirements set out in section 164(5), the dissident must have at least sent the company an 
objection notice and voted against the resolution. 
A dissident who has not received the meeting notice is excused from having to give the 
objection notice in as much as section 164(6) states that the requirement of 
section 164(5)(a)(i) does not apply. The inclusion of this exception is laudable. It would be 
unjust, unfair and, indeed, irrational for a dissident to be denied the appraisal remedy in 
circumstances where the company did not give a proper meeting notice. 
Unfortunately, the legislature fell short. The exception in section 164(6), regarding the 
objection notice, fails to takes into account that the dissident is also required to vote against 
the resolution to perfect the appraisal remedy. If a dissident is excused from complying with 
the objection notice requirement on the basis that it did not receive the meeting notice, how 
then is it that a dissident is expected to know that it is required to vote against the resolution, 
notice of which it has not received? This cannot be explained. This is the vote anomaly. 
7.3 Notice of adoption of the resolution 
Within ten business days after the company has adopted the resolution, it must send an 













notice, has not withdrawn that objection notice, or voted in support of the resolution.
138
 It is 
not clear how the company will know whether the dissident voted against the resolution or 
not. Presumably, the company secretary will keep a record of the votes cast against the 
resolution. If the company fails to send the adoption notice to a dissident, it suffers no 
adverse consequences139 however, it does cause problems. These problems will be addressed 
in due course. Nevertheless, the company does not have to send the adoption notice to any 
person other than dissidents that gave an objection notice, voted against the resolution and 
did not withdraw the notice. It is uncertain why a dissident would want or need to withdraw 
the notice. Such a withdrawal is irrelevant as nothing turns on it.  
8. THE DEMAND 
The demand is a written notice and must contain the details in section 164(8).140 The dissident 
must send the demand to the company within 20 business days after receiving the adoption 
notice,
141
 or within 20 business days after learning that the resolution has been adopted.142 
The demand must also be sent to the Panel.
143
 
Similarly, in Canada, it is only after the resolution is passed that the dissident must provide 
the number and class of shares in respect of which he dissents by way of demand. However, 
section 190(7) of the Canadian Act does not set a fixed deadline. The deadline may extend to 
20 days after the dissident learns of the adoption of the resolution. In the case of South 
Africa, this requirement is problematic.  
As has become apparent, the appraisal remedy must be engaged before it is perfected in both 
the Companies Act and the Canadian Act. 
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In the Companies Act, an objection notice and vote against the resolution is required. The 
right is perfected by the demand. Once the demand is sent, the company is on terms. The 
dissident may revoke the demand at any point. 
In the Canadian Act, an objection notice is required but sufficient to entitle the dissident to 
make the demand. Once the demand is given, the right is perfected. Similarly, the dissident 
may revoke the demand. 
8.1 Demand  
As a result of the vote anomaly, a dissident who did not receive the meeting notice is excused 
from having to give the objection notice. As pointed out, it is unlikely that such a dissident 
would have been aware of the vote requirement, in the absence of the meeting notice. In the 
absence of a vote against the resolution, such a dissident will be unable to make a valid 
demand. It should be noted that section 164(6) does not excuse the failure to vote in the same 
way that it excuses the failure to give the objection notice. 
8.2 Rights Cease upon Demand 
A dissident who has otherwise complied with the procedural requirements provided for in 
section 164 and sent a demand has no further rights in respect of its shares, other than to be 
paid their fair value.
144
 
In relation to the predecessor of the Canadian Act, a Canadian court held, in Brant 
Investments Ltd v Keeprite Inc,
145
 that a dissident did not lose the right to challenge 
oppressive action. On the other hand, a later court held that there is no reason to read the 
language of section 190(11) of the Canadian Act so as to restrict 'rights as a shareholder' only 
to matters such as voting and receiving dividends. It would also preclude a shareholder from 
bringing an oppression action under section 241.146 
In terms of the Companies Act, the dissidents would presumably also lose their rights to 
future distributions, if declared,147 and to vote, however, the precise extent of the 'relinquished 
rights' is uncertain. It should be noted that it is not particularly clear how it is that 
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distributions and voting rights are the only two rights that have been identified as being 
relinquished. For example, would the dissidents have the right to bring an oppression 
application as suggested in the Brant case? The concern is that during the period commencing 
on demand and enduring until receipt of payment, which may be of uncertain duration, the 
company might take steps that are prejudicial to the interests of such dissidents. 
Whilst a full discussion of the issue raised by this question is not within the scope of this 
dissertation, reference may be had to some the remedies provided for in the Companies Act, 
the locus standi of claimants in relation to such remedies and the nature of the relief that may 
be sought. 
The statutory derivative action may be initiated by a person entitled to be registered as a 
shareholder148 or if the person has been granted leave of the court.149 The category of persons 
entitled to serve the demand is wide, and can accommodate a dissident, particularly where 
leave of the court is sought and granted. 
An application to declare a director delinquent or under probation may be moved by a 
shareholder, director, company secretary or prescribed officer, a registered trade union or 
another representative of the employees of a company.150 In addition, the Commission and the 
Panel have standing.151 Assuming that for the purposes of section 162 the dissident does not 
have standing it may always initiate a complaint to the Commission in terms of section 
168(1), the locus standi requirements of which are then restrictive. The Commission or the 
Panel may, as a result of such complaint, make an application contemplated in section 162 
where grounds exist therefor. 
A declaratory order contemplated in section 161, by its very nature, would be appropriate, 
particularly when a dissident is uncertain of its rights as shareholder, if any. It contemplates 
that a court may give an order determining any rights of a securities holder in terms of the 
Companies Act and the constitutional documents
152
 and in addition, an order to protect such 
rights,
153
 or an order to rectify harm suffered by the securities holder in question.
154
  
                                                      
148
 Section 165(2)(a). 
149
 Section 165(2)(d). 
150
 Section 162(2). 
151
 Section 162(3). 
152
 Section 161(1)(a). 
153













The most potent section of the Companies Act available to the dissident is section 218(2), a 
general remedy available to any person to sue any other person who contravenes any 
provision of the Companies Act for any loss or damage suffered as a result of the 
contravention. It has been submitted that 'contravene' here would include, in addition to any 
offence', any non-compliance with a provision of the Companies Act that may not be an 
offence.155 It should be noted that there is no fault requirement in the section. Accordingly 
liability is strict. 
In relation to the oppression remedy contemplated in section 163, it appears that the open list 
of orders that may be given by a court,156 are directed at giving relief to an applicant seeking a 
remedy to the enjoyment of their rights qua shareholder. The interplay between the rights 
sought to be protected under this remedy and those contemplated in the appraisal remedy, 
appear to be at odds. Whilst the oppression remedy is aimed at restoring a state of affairs for 
the applicant's benefit, the appraisal remedy is directed towards the smooth exit from the 
company. Put differently, the oppression remedy appears to be a remedy suitable for a 
shareholder wishing to remain a shareholder and wanting to enjoy their rights as such, whilst 
the appraisal remedy is one upon which a dissident relies in order to exit a company after 
having elected to relinquish its rights as a shareholder. As to whether a dissident could assert 
both remedies, it seems that there would be limited opportunities to pursue an order under 
both sections in relation to one class of shares. 
9. THE OFFER  
9.1 The Written Offer 
In terms of section 164(11), the company must make an offer to dissidents within five days of 
the latter of the effective date of transaction,157 or the last day for the receipt of demands in 
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terms of subsection (7)(a),158 or the day the company received a demand as contemplated in 
subsection (7)(b), if applicable.159 
This last option in section 164(11)(c) is problematic. In order for the company to interpret 
section 164(11)(c), it will need to know whether the circumstances in section 164(7)(b) are 
indeed 'applicable'. Initially it seems unclear as to how this will be determined. In order to 
interpret the section, the company will have to have an insight as to whether the dissident 
received the adoption notice under section 164(4), which would trigger the 20 business day 
period within with the dissident may dispatch a demand, as provided for in the subsection.  
 Every offer made by the company to dissidents in respect of shares of the same class or 
series must be on the same terms.
160
 It is unclear what the phrase 'or series' refers to as it does 
not appear in the Companies Act again. Unlike the Canadian Act, there is no provision in the 
Companies Act for the issues of a 'series' of shares. This must be a drafting error. The 
statement showing how the value of the shares was determined must accompany the offer.  
There is no indication in the Canadian Act or in the Companies Act of the details that such a 
statement should contain. 
9.2 Written offer problem 
The company must establish the point in time when the dissident contemplated in 
section 164(7)(b) learns of the adoption of the resolution so that it can calculate when the 20 
business day period lapses before having to make the required offer. If a dissident is entitled 
to make a demand within 20 business days of learning of the adoption of the resolution,161 a 
literal interpretation of section 164(11)(c) will have the result that the obligation of the 
company to send the offer to the dissident may never arise.162 The dissident may never learn 
that the resolution has been adopted, and consequently never make the demand contemplated 
in section 164(11)(c).  
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There is no guidance as to how a company would establish whether the dissident 
contemplated in section 164(7)(b) has learned of the adoption of the resolution. What is clear, 
however, is that the company has no incentive to establish the date in question. It would be in 
the company's selfish interest for the dissident in question to never learn of the resolution and 
never make a demand.  
How is the company to anticipate that the demand contemplated in section 164(11)(c) will 
ever come? The dissident who has sent an objection notice and voted against a resolution, is 
not thereby obliged to make a demand. May the company continue to wait for the demand ad 
infinitem, and as a consequence never have to make an offer. That cannot be what the 
legislature intended. 
I submit that the company must make an offer after the effective date163 or after the period for 
sending demands have elapsed,164 notwithstanding the date on which the dissident 'learned' of 
the adoption of the resolution for the following reasons. he date that the dissident 
contemplated in section 164(11)(c) may be deemed to have received the adoption notice must 
be calculated in accordance with sections 6(10) and 6(11)165 read with regulations 7(1), 7(2) 
and Table CR3 of the Company Regulations ('the deemed receipt method'). Read together 
these provisions set out a method according to which notices sent in terms of and in 
accordance with the Companies Act are deemed to have been received. This will be 20 days 
after the notice was sent. If the deemed receipt method is not employed, the possibility exists 
for circumstances to arise in terms of which the company may refrain from making the 
required offer. 
9.3 Acceptance and lapse of the Written Offer 
A dissident who has made a demand can either accept the offer
166
 or apply to a Court to 
determine a fair value of the relevant shares, but before the offer lapses.
167
 The offer lapses 
after 30 business days. 
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If a dissident accepts the offer, the dissident must either tender the share certificates, or take 
the steps required in terms of section 53 in the case of uncertificated shares.
168
 
It has been suggested169 that a dissident is not required to indicate acceptance of the offer in a 
written notice or by any means other than by tendering its shares. Section 164(13) states that 
'(i)f a shareholder accepts an offer ... the shareholder must ... tender the relevant share 
certificates to the company or the company’s transfer agent'.170 Whilst the Act is silent on the 
manner in which acceptance of the offer is to be communicated, it is clear that the acceptance 
of the offer and the tender of the share certificates are two separate and distinct acts. The 
tender of the certificates follows upon acceptance of the offer. The mere tender of the shares 
as suggested would not meet the common law requirements that acceptance be inter alia 
unequivocal171 and correspond to the offer.172 If anything, the offer ought to set out the 
manner in which acceptance should be communicated. In the absence of such an indication, it 
is doubted that a mere tender would suffice. 
The offer lapses if it has not been accepted within 30 busin ss days after it was made. In this 
event, all the dissident's rights in respect of the shares are reinstated without interruption.173 
10. APPLICATION 
10.1 Application to Court174 
If the company has failed to make an offer, or has made an offer that the dissident considers 
to be inadequate, and that offer has not lapsed, a dissident may apply to the Court to 
determine a fair value in respect of the shares, and for an order requiring the company to pay 
the dissident the fair value.
175
 All dissidents who have not accepted an offer from the 
company as at the date of the application must be joined as parties and are bound by the 
decision of the court.176 
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The period within which a dissident must make an application commences and expires only if 
the company makes an offer, failing which the dissident is not on terms to initiate an 
application. There is not sanction or penalty provided for in section 164, in circumstances 
where a company fails to make an offer. If such a state of affairs prevails, the result would be 
untenable.  
If no offer is forthcoming, a dissident may have to resort to an alternative remedy. The 
question whether the dissident has recourse to an alternative remedy has been considered on 
page 30. 
In the circumstances, a dissident may resort to section 218(2) in terms of which any person 
who contravenes a provision of the Companies Act is liable to any other person for 
consequent loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention. This provision is notable 
for two important reasons. As indicated on page 31, any person has locus standi whether they 
have shareholder rights or not, and liability is strict.177 The declarator contemplated in 
section 161 may also be an appropriate avenue of relief. 
Whilst it may be that the right to claim payment of the fair value prescribes in accordance 
with the Prescription Act,178 the prescription period will only commence once the right to 
receive payment vests in the dissident. 
10.2 Lapsed Dissident Anomaly 
Upon application to court, the company is required to notify each 'affected dissident' who has 
not accepted an offer of the date, place and consequences of the application and of their right 
to participate in the proceedings.
179
 It is not clear who falls into the category of such affected 
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dissidents.180 The easy answer would be that the 'affected dissidents' are 'all dissidents who 
have not accepted an offer from the company as at the date of the application'.181  
The Canadian Act is clear in as much as it requires that the dissidents who are party to the 
application are 'all dissidents whose shares have not been purchased by the company.'182 This 
is significant. The Canadian Act does not make provision for the lapse of an offer and for the 
reinstatement of the dissident's rights. 
This is in contrast to the position in the Companies Act, where a dissident’s rights in respect 
of the shares are reinstated without interruption183 if a dissident to whom an offer was made 
allows the offer to lapse.184 A dissident whose offer has not lapsed has locus standi to bring 
the application.185 Nevertheless, the court must join the dissidents that have not accepted the 
offer and they will be bound by the court's order, notwithstanding that they may be joined 
after the 30 business day period provided for in section 164(9)(a) has lapsed. 
All dissidents whose offers have lapsed are ipso facto dissidents that have 'not accepted offers 
as at the date of the application' and they must be joined to the application.186 Even if their 
offers haven't lapsed as at the date of the application, their offers will by the effluxion of time 
lapse during the application process. There is no provision in section 164 which states in 
express terms that upon being joined by the court as an applicant, the dissidents' rights are 
again terminated or suspended, notwithstanding that their rights may have been reinstated as 
contemplated in section 164(10). 
It bears repeating that dissidents have their rights reinstated once their offers lapse, and are 
entitled to receive any benefit that may accrue to the shares in question.187 It appears that this 
is the case regardless that such dissidents have been joined in the court application. This is 
the lapsed dissidents' anomaly. 
At any time before the Court gives the order contemplated in section 164(15)(c)(v)(bb), a 
dissident, even a dissident whose offer has lapsed, it seems may accept the offer made by the 
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company with those of section 164(11). In such a case the dissident must comply with the 
requirements of section 164(13)(a) and the company with those section 164(13)(b).
188
 
This is intended to promote settlement, but may also be subjected to abuse by dissidents. In 
respect of costs orders, the Act provides that the court may make an appropriate order of 
costs, having regard to any offer made by the company, and the final determination of the fair 
value by the court.
189  190
 
10.3 Security for Cost 
In terms of section 190(18) of the Canadian Act, a dissident is not required to give security 
for costs in an application for a court valuation.191 There is no such rule in the Companies 
Act. Security for costs are determined with reference to the Uniform Rules of Court and to 
the extent relevant, the common law. 
In terms of Rule 47(1), a party entitled and wishing to demand security for costs from another 
shall, as soon as practicable after the commencement of proceedings, deliver a notice setting 
forth the grounds upon which such security is claimed, and the amount demanded.'192 In terms 
of Rule 47(3),193 'if the party from whom security is demanded contests his liability to give 
security or if he fails or refuses to furnish security, the other party may apply to court on 
notice for an order that such security be given and that the proceedings be stayed until such 
order is complied with.' 
The application of the quoted rules may be unjust, particularly in the circumstances where the 
dissident moving the application is vexatious and fails to give security when required or 
directed to do so. In such circumstances, the company may have the proceedings stayed, to 
the prejudice of bona fide dissidents, until such time as appropriate security is furnished. 
Proceedings may be delayed unnecessarily. 
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10.4 The Dominus Litis, the onus of proof and the evidentiary burden 
The onus of proof194 refers to 'the obligation of a party to persuade the trier of facts by the end 
of the case of the truth of certain propositions'.195 The incidence of the onus of proof is 
determined by the applicable substantive law rule,196 and ordinarily falls on the dominus 
litis.197 In the case of an application brought in terms of section 164, the dominus litus would 
ordinarily be the applying dissident. 
The burden of proof or the evidentiary burden, as opposed to the onus of proof, refers to the 
'duty cast upon a litigant to adduce evidence in order to combat a prima facie case made by 
his opponent',198 and may also be described as the 'burden of adducing evidence in rebuttal'.199  
In the Canadian case law, it is generally accepted that the company has access to, and more 
often than not holds the information and data relevant to the determination of a fair value.
200
 
In terms of the Canadian Act, the company is also the first party entitled to approach the 
court,201 and as such, the company assumes the position of dominus litis in the conduct of the 
application ordinarily.202 203 However, the duty is upon the court to determine what the fair 
value is. There is no onus of proof on either party.204 The Canadian court is entitled to direct a 
trial to determine the fair value of the shares.205 The trial court may, in its discretion, require 
further or other evidence from either or both parties. It is empowered to appoint one or more 
appraisers to assist it in fixing fair value.
206
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10.5 The Appraiser 
In the Canadian case law, there appears to be no uniform approach to the role of the 
appraiser. The court in Neonex International Ltd v Kolasa expressed the difficulty in relation 
to the appraiser thus: 
'Where an amalgamated company has only one easily appraised piece of property, the 
appointment of an independent appraiser might be appropriate. It is not suitable where the 
nature of the company's operations is complex. Who would pay the cost of the appraiser 
during the course of such an inquiry? An appraiser could take months or years to conduct an 
investigation. Generally speaking, the court will only award costs at the conclusion of a 
proceeding. They cannot be advanced part way through to help finance the other side's claim 
or defence. From whom would the appraiser take his instructions? Not from the court because 
it must remain impartial. If the court were to appoint an appraiser, where would
.
 the onus of 
proof lie? Whose witness is the appraiser? What happens if the appraiser's evidence is shown 
to be erroneous? What other evidence would the court need to reach a decision? The court's 
procedure, the rules of evidence and the adversarial system cannot adjust to the kind of 
inquiry contemplated in the court appointment of an appraiser.'207 
It is not within the scope of this dissertation to discuss the merit of the issues raised by the 
court in Neonex. However, it would be interesting to see how a South African acquits itself in 
this regard. 
10.6 Court's Duty and Discretion 
It was first suggested, in relation to the Companies Bill, that the court must determine a fair 
value and not the fair value, and presumably that '(f)air value is a range of values and not a 
particular figure'.208 Although the comment was first made in relation to the Companies Bill, 
the wording in question may be found in the Companies Act.209 Indeed, the author of the 
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suggestion in question is also the author of the chapter on the appraisal remedy in the leading 
textbook on company law. The suggestion is reproduced in the textbook.210  
The particular phrase is borrowed from the Canadian Act.211 The concern relates to the 
conceptualisation of '(f)air value (as) a range of values'. The distinction is important in as 
much as the dissident may demand, company is required to offer and, if that offer is accepted, 
pay 'the fair value'.212 In the event of a judicial appraisal, the dissident must apply to court for 
an order that the company pay 'the fair value'.213 The court is entitled to appoint an appraiser 
to assist in determining 'the fair value',214 make an order as to costs having regard to the offer 
made by the company and the final determination of 'the fair value' by the court215 and order 
the company to 'pay the fair value'.216 However, the dissident 'may apply to a court to 
determine a fair value'217 and the court 'must determine a fair value'218 of the shares of all 
dissenting shareholders, subject to the provisions of section 1654(16), which refers to 'the fair 
value'. 
This suggestion was considered in Fraser Inc v Aitken219 in relation to the Canadian Act. At 
issue was whether the court had some form of discretion in fixing the fair value of shares that 
was not possessed by the company. The court expressed some reservation about exercising 
such a discretion if, indeed, it existed.
220
 The Canadian commentary states that 'the 
assumptions and the problems of interpretation required to sustain the proposition need only 
be stated to demonstrate how very unlikely it was that the Legislature intended to confer any 
kind of discretion upon the court in selecting a fair value for the shares. However, it is even 
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clearer that as a matter of policy it is not desirable for dissident shareholders to seek the 
assistance of the courts frivolously.'
221
 In Fraser Inc v Aitken it was held that:
222
 
'Recourse to the Court is a necessary safeguard to assure that a corporation acts re-
sponsibly and fairly in making its offer of the fair value, but it would be an un-
fortunate perversion of that safeguard if it came to be assumed by shareholders that 
application to the Court practically assured a bonus over what was offered. In my 
view, resort should be had to any discretion which may be found in the section only 
where the evidence discloses special circumstance will clearly call for its exercise.' 
10.7 Valuation objective 
Section 164(15)(c)(ii) states that the court must determine a fair value in respect of the shares 
of the dissidents.  Section 164(16) provides that the fair value in respect of any shares must 
be determined 'as at the date on which and time immediately before the company adopted the 
resolutions that gave rise to the transaction'. Save as aforesaid, the Companies Act provides 
no guidance as to how the fair value of the shares ought to be determined.  
The Delaware Law merely states that fair value should be determined with reference to 'all 
relevant factors' and 'exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger'.223 In Delaware, the 'court's task in an appraisal proceeding is to 
value what has been taken from the dissident, being the pro rata interest in the going 
concern'.224 
In Canada, the 'fair value' of the company is determined with reference to 'the highest price 
available in an open and unrestricted market between informed, prudent parties acting at 
arm's length and under no compulsion to act, expressed in terms of money or money's 
worth.'
225
 The 'fair value' of a dissident's shareholding, as in Delaware, is considered to be the 
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proportionate interest in the company as a going concern, being the pro rata share of the en 
bloc value without a minority discount.
226
 
Four methods of valuation are generally accepted by the courts:227 the market value approach, 
the net assets approach, and the earnings of investment value approach or some combination 
of the three approaches.228 Whilst it is not within the scope of this dissertation to consider the 
voluminous case law in relation to the appropriateness or otherwise of favouring one 
approach over another, it bears mentioning that each has advantages in particular 
circumstances.  
Whilst net asset valuation tends to undervalue shares, it does provide a back-stop for other 
valuation methods.
229
 Nevertheless, there are certain types of enterprises for which the 
approach has been favoured, particularly for companies in the natural resources sector, where 
the value of such companies are determined with reference to underlying assets.
230
 
The use of the market value approach gives the most objective results, but prices within 
capital markets are susceptible to inexplicable fluctuations and extraneous factors that may 
distort the value of a company. A strict market value approach may result in arbitrary 
values.
231
 Market prices may be helpful if they represent an actively traded market immune 
from unusual factors.232 However, valuations of shares that are not traded regularly or are 
traded in a thin market, carry less weight.233 
Whilst the discounted cash flow method is accepted as a legitimate valuation technique in the 
financial community,
234
 particular assumptions underlying its application in particular 
circumstances may always be challenged. The particular assumptions and applicable criteria 
upon which the method relies may be subjectively weighted. For this reason, the Delaware 
                                                      
226
 Fung op cit note 34 at 76 and the authorities cited there. 
227
 Brant Investments v KeepRite op cit note 145, per Anderson J. at 115. Cf Domglas Inc v Jarislowsky, Fraser 
& Co (1982) 22 BLR 121. 
228
 Neonex v Kolasa op cit note 202; Domglas Inc v Jarislowsky op cit note 227; LoCicero v BACM Industries 
op cit note 266; Brant Investments v KeepRite op cit note 145. 
229
 Abraham v Inter Wide Investments Ltd (1988) 66 OR (2d) 684 (HC). 
230
 'Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate Law' (1997) 22 Del J Corp L 291 at 305. 
231
 McGuinness op cit note 130 at 1037. 
232
 Silber v BGR supra note 75. 
233
 Vern Krishna 'Determining the 'Fair Value' of Corporate Shares' (1987-1988) 13 Can Bus LJ 132 at 156 - 
157 and the authorities cited therein. Cf Manning v Harris Steel Group Inc [1987] 1 WWR 86. 
234
 See Steven P. Lamb and John Day 'Some Courts Are Using New Approach to Set Dissenting Shares' Value' 
(1991) National LJ at 58, which notes that discounted cash flow method has become the 'methodology of 

















Courts in Canada and Delaware have adopted similar approaches to determining fair value; a 
dissident is entitled to a pro rata share of the going concern value of the enterprise.
236
  Both 
jurisdictions have concluded that the generally accepted commercial practice of valuation is 
the acceptable method for determining the value of an enterprise. 
In Canada and in Delaware there is consensus regarding acceptable valuation methods, but it 
is acknowledged that the determination of 'fair value' is inexact, because of the variety of 
valuation methods accepted and the flexibility permitted within financial reporting 
standards.
237
 This practical problem of value determination, together with the long-standing 
tradition of judicial deference to honest business judgments made in good faith, has led the 




Although, the appraisal remedy does not call upon the court to determine the fairness of a 
transaction, there is no onus on either party to establish fairness or unfairness.
239
 However, a 
fair and objective process in relation to the negotiation by the company of the transaction 
agreement and the determination of the transaction consideration has evidentiary value in 
establishing whether the majority exploited its power.
240 
 For that reason, it has been 
suggested that a 'fair process' will yield a 'fair result'.241 
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10.8 Court Order 
Where an application is made for an appraisal, the court is under a duty to determine the fair 
value of the shares of all dissidents.242 Once the court has determined the fair value, the Court 
must then make an order requiring the dissidents to either withdraw their demand or tender 
their share certificates,243 and requiring the company to pay the fair value in respect of their 
shares to each dissident who tenders its share certificates.244 Such an order is subject to any 
conditions the court considers necessary to ensure that the company fulfils its obligations 
under this section.245 
It has been noted that section 164(15)(c)(v) is poorly drafted, in as much as it is unclear what 
order a court may give.
246
 If a withdrawal of the demand is ordered or chosen, as the case 
may be, it is assumed that the dissident's rights in respect of the shares are reinstated without 
interruption.247 This may not be possible since the Companies Act does not provide for the 
reinstatement of rights in the event of an election or order to withdraw at such an advanced 
stage of the appraisal process. Section 164(10) provides for the reinstatement of rights if any 
of the circumstances in 164(9) arise. There are three possibilities. First, reinstatement is 
possible if the demand is withdrawn before the offer is made.248 This is not possible in the 
circumstances, since the offer has been made. In order to approach the court, the offer must 
have been made and not lapsed.249 Secondly, reinstatement is possible if the company did not 
make an offer.250 For the same reason as in the first instance, this is also not possible. Thirdly, 
reinstatement is possible if the resolution is revoked.251 Again, this will not be the case. 
Notwithstanding the problem in relation to whether the rights of the dissident may be 
reinstated, there is the question as to whether the election to withdraw the demand or tender 
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the certificates falls to the dissident.
252
 There is an argument to be made that the election 
interpretation was the intention of the legislature. Assuming the withdrawal of the demand 
and reinstatement of rights is competent, the construction of section 164(15)(c)(v) remains 
two-fold. The section states that one of the options in section 164(15)(c)(v)(aa) must be 
elected, namely withdraw the demand or tender the certificates. The order must also require 
the company to pay the fair value to each dissident 'who complies with subsection (13)(a)'.253 
It appears to be implied that the dissident may comply with subsection (13)(a) and the result 
is that the company need not pay the dissident who does not comply with subsection (13)(a). 
Had section 164(15)(c)(v)(bb) been stated as ' requiring ... the company to pay the fair value 
in respect of their shares to each dissenting shareholder ordered to tender their certificates as 
contemplated in subsection (13)(a)' the position would have been less ambiguous. 
The other interpretation could be that there is no choice, that the Court will order the 
dissidents either to withdraw the demand or to accept the offer, and that the dissident does not 
have a choice, other than to comply with the particular order.
254
 Both interpretations raise 
concern. Whilst the first interpretation may appear to be a literal reading of the section, the 
second interpretation is the more palatable of the two.255 Even if the second interpretation is 
favoured, a further problem remains.  
Regardless of which interpretation prevails, if the dissident remains a shareholder in the 
company after the implementation of the transaction, the intention of the parties is ignored, 
and the purpose for which the transaction was conceived is subverted.256 This is a particular 
concern in the context of a squeeze out merger, where the purpose of the transaction is to 
eliminate minorities, particularly in circumstances where the target company of which the 
dissident was a shareholder no longer exists.  
If section 164(15)(c)(v) is interpreted to give the dissident the election to tender the 
certificates or withdraw the demand, dissidents would be encouraged to employ the appraisal 
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remedy as a 'no-lose' technique. Dissidents may then be able to select the fair value offered, 
or the judicially determined fair value, if the latter exceeds the original offer.257 
As a final comment, it may be suggested that the order of the court in this regard be confined 
to the terms of the provision which enable the dissident to make the application in the first 
place, namely section 164(14), in terms of which a dissident may apply to the Court to 
determine a fair value in respect of the shares, and for an order requiring the company to pay 
the dissident the fair value.
258
 In addition, guidance may be taken from section 164(15)(c)(v) 
which states that the order is subject to such conditions the court considers necessary to 
ensure that the company fulfils its obligations under the section, the chief of which is to pay 
their fair value. 
It is unclear what the legislature was trying to achieve by straying from the wording of the 
Canadian Act, which follows the Delaware Law. The Canadian Act simply states that '(t)he 
final order of the court shall be rendered against the corporation in favour of each dissenting 
shareholder and for the amount fixed by the court.'259 
10.9 Costs Orders 
In relation to the court's discretion to award costs, and give cost orders, the concern has been 
articulated that such cost orders will deter dissidents from pursuing judicial appraisal. The 
concern arises out of the uncertainty of the valuation process which may yield unpredictable 
results, since 'valuation is not an exact science but merely a prediction or an estimate'.260 If 
the basis of this concern is to be accepted, the question unfortunately arises as to how the 
court can be expected to better do the job of determining the fair value of the shares than the 
company and its board of directors. The company's determination of fair value is, in the 
absence of fraud, mala fides or negligence, akin to a business judgment. In the case of Black v 
Black261 four different appraisers came to vastly different conclusions as the value of shares 
held by a husband in a divorce case. Although different considerations were applicable, the 
values of the shares ranged from eight million to forty three million dollars. The point made 
was that subjective considerations may lead to inaccurate results.  
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The valuations reached in the Black matter may be as different as the valuations that might be 
reached by the company, the court and the dissident. What then is the test for awarding costs? 
Bona fides, diligence, fortitude, humility or candour? These are not qualities that the court is 
called upon to assess. In appraisal remedy proceedings, the court is constrained by the duty it 
is required to discharge, namely the determination of the fair value of the shares. 
It is hoped that the courts will maintain this duty in mind in exercising their discretion with 
regard to orders of costs.262 Nevertheless, the court's discretion as to costs ought to be 
exercised to avoid fruitless litigation by unreasonable or opportunistic parties.263 
10.10 Interest 
Canadian case law is full of considerations that may be taken into account when determining 
the rate of interest that may be awarded to a dissident. The primary consideration is to 
reimburse the dissident.264 The company has had the use of the dissident's money and the 
dissident has been deprived of the use of the same. The dissident would have been able to 
earn a rate of return on his money. It should also be acknowledged that had it not been for the 
transaction, the shares would still have been 'locked' in the company, and earning the return 
then in place. There is no reason that the dissident should be afforded rights more 
advantageous than those that prevailed before the commencement of the transaction. 
In its discretion, the court may award interest from the date of approval of the resolution.265 
Although the provision is clear, perhaps a better date from which to calculate interest would 
have been from the date on which the dissident would have received the payment of the fair 
value of the shares but for the declined offer and the court application. This is the date that 
non-litigating dissidents would have been paid and the date upon which the litigating 
dissidents would have been paid had it not been for the court application. Non litigating 
dissidents are not entitled to interest from the date of approval of the resolution until the date 
they are paid. There does not appear to be any policy reason why the litigating dissidents earn 
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interest for a period during which the co-operating dissidents were also 'out of pocket', for 
lack of a better expression.  
In LoCicero v BACM Industries Ltd, the court stated that in circumstances where the 
company is found to have offered fair value to dissidents, it is more appropriate to award 
interest to dissidents at a rate of return which the dissident could have obtained by placing his 
funds in a long-term investment rather that at what it would have cost the company to 
borrow.266 
Notwithstanding the LoCicero matter, the determination of the rate of interest might be made 
with reference to the underlying causa of the dispute. In transactions other than squeeze-outs, 
were it not for the transaction, or the amendment, the dissident would not be contesting the 
fair valuation of its shares. Instead, the capital represented by such shares would be earning a 
rate of return acceptable to the dissident, which rate would be equal to the internal rate of 
return enjoyed by the shareholders prior to the transaction. The court might be invited to 
assume that were it not for the transaction, the dissid nt would have been a content 
shareholder, with its capital invested in the company, with a right to no more or no less than 
the rate applicable to the shares on the day before the resolution was adopted. 
11. PAYMENT 
11.1 Obligation to Pay 
The company must pay the agr ed amount within 10 business days after the dissident accepts 
the offer and tenders the share certificates or directs the transfer of uncertificated shares.
267
 




Section 164 does not contemplate a situation where a company does not make an offer or, 
after an offer is accepted or fair value has been judicially determined, fails to pay the 
dissident. If the dissident accepts an offer and the company does not pay, the dissident may 
rely upon a number of remedies in the circumstances. The dissident may initiate an action in 
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terms of section 218(2) of the Companies Act in terms of which '(a)ny person who 
contravenes any provision of this Act is liable to any other person for any loss or damage 
suffered by that person as a result of that contravention'. The dissident would be entitled to 
employ the summary judgment procedure available in terms of the uniform rules of court. 
The circumstances must be distinguished from those referred to in the case of Ford Motor 
Co.269 
11.2 Variation of the Company's Obligations 
If, however, there are reasonable grounds to believe that payment by the company of the fair 
value would result in the company being unable to pay its debts as they fall due and payable 




It was suggested271 that the fair value payment accepted by the dissident should be taken into 
consideration if a court varies the company's obligations to pay in terms of section 164(17). 
The suggestion is based on the reasoning that '(t)he court is not asked to determine the fair 
value for the shares when the company brings this application'.272 The court, it is argued, is 
merely asked to 'vary the company's existing obligations in a just and equitable way, having 
regard to its financial circumstances'.
273
  
I submit that the variation in relation to the company's obligation might entail no more than 
an order in terms of which a company may discharge its obligations over an extended period, 
in light of the fact that the liquidity of the company might be stressed. The Companies Act 
contemplates this scenario.274  
The suggestion that the variation could be applicable to the value of the shares is not 
sustainable in light of the very purpose of the appraisal remedy. The point of which is to 
determine the fair value of the shares. A variation of the amount payable would necessarily 
entail an amount payable that is not fair value. Furthermore, the issue to be considered when 
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a company makes an application under section 164(17) is liquidity, or cash flow. A mere 
reduction of the fair value payable would not necessarily restore liquidity. However, interim 
payment of instalments would achieve this result. 
Finally, it is suggested that in return for the reduction of the fair value, the court might 
consider reinstating the dissidents' rights in respect of his shares, if such an order would be 
just and equitable.
275
 This is not a competent order of the court. It is submitted that in making 
an order in terms of section 164(17)(b), the court is entitled to ensure that the dissident is paid 
at the earliest possible date compatible with the company satisfying its other financial 
obligations as they fall due and payable'.276 In addition, the company in relation to which the 
suggested rights may be reinstated may no longer be in existence. 
PART D: CONCLUSION 
The first problem identified in section 164 is the notice anomaly. The consequence of the 
notice anomaly turns on the exclusion provided for in section 164(6). Although the dissident 
is excused from having to give the objection notice, section 164(6) does not excuse the 
dissident who fails to vote against the resolution. Section 164(6) falls short, in that it does not 
take into account that the dissident, by reason of not receiving the meeting notice, is unaware 
of the meeting, and unaware of the fact that in order invoke the appraisal remedy it is 
required to vote against the resolution. There is no apparent cure to the notice anomaly and 
the consequences that flow therefrom. The cause of this problem is that insufficient 
recognition is given to the defective notice, which should render the meeting null and void as 
contemplated in section 62. If the defective notice received the attention that it ought to have 
received, the notice anomaly would be eliminated. 
There is no apparent reason why the dissident should be required to give the objection notice 
and be required to vote against the resolution. This additional requirement, to vote against the 
resolution, is not found in the Canadian Act. Whilst the drafters of section 164 may have had 
noble intentions, their failure to have regard to the consequences of the addition of the nix 
vote, compounds the problem resulting from the notice anomaly. Even if it is the intention of 
the legislature to treat notices for transactions in the extraordinary manner contemplated 
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above, the objection notice problem could be avoided by dispensing with either the objection 
notice or the nix vote.  
The ambiguity in section 164(5) in relation to whether the dissident's demand must be in 
relation to all of the shares of the company or only shares of a class does not admit of a 
satisfactory solution. The implied qualifier proposed is inelegant and unlikely to find judicial 
support particularly in a jurisdiction where the bench refrains from naked legislating. 
The company is required to give the adoption notice to each dissident who gave the objection 
notice. Although an exception is made for dissidents who failed to give the objection notice 
in relation to their right to make a demand in terms of section 164(6), it is unlikely that such a 
dissident would be given the adoption notice, in as much as the company has not received 
from the dissident in question the objection notice.  
As a further consequence of the vote anomaly, a dissident who subsequently discovers of a 
resolution passed pursuant to a transaction, does not qualify to make a demand, in as much as 
section 164(6) does not excuse non compliance with the nix vote requirement. There is no 
cure for the consequence of the vote anomaly. 
The next problem which arises due to an innovation introduced by the drafters of section 164 
which is not found in the Canadian Act is the lapsed dissident anomaly. The consequence of a 
lapsed offer is that it is unclear whether the reinstated rights endure notwithstanding a 
subsequent application to the court for a judicial appraisal of fair value. There is no indication 
in the section that a court may suspend rights which have been reinstated by virtue of the 
lapsed offer. The untenable situation arises that dissidents who must be joined as applicants 
notwithstanding their apathy, they continue to exercise their shareholder rights. As mentioned 
above, the lapsed dissident anomaly arises out of an innovation for which there is no apparent 
reason. 
The last problem relates to the construction of section 164(15)(c)(v) and the difficulties of 
interpreting the section in order to provide for an order which does not subvert the purpose of 
the appraisal remedy. It is unclear why the drafters of section 164 would contemplate giving a 
dissident an opportunity to withdraw its demand at such a late stage of the proceedings. There 













In the introduction to this dissertation I stated that it has been acknowledged that the appraisal 
remedy is complicated, technical, time-consuming and procedurally rigid. I also noted that 
the appraisal remedy had been criticised for these very reasons. The issues that I have 
identified lend weight to these acknowledgments and criticisms but for different reasons. The 
criticism that I referred to in the introduction was directed at the basic framework of the 
appraisal remedy and the perceived bias in favour of the company and the burden to be borne 
by the dissident. As I mentioned at the outset the purpose of this dissertation was not to 
consider the conceptual merit of the appraisal remedy but to assess whether the remedy was 
fit for purpose. The foregoing analysis shows that the legislative tinkering by the drafters of 
section 164 have not only added nothing of any substance to the Canadian Act but have 
rendered the remedy impotent and has blunted its purpose.  
The drafters of the appraisal remedy may have had good intentions. It is unfortunate however 
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